On the same day this past week that The New York Times devoted much space to exploring a debate among counterterrorism officials as to which poses the greater danger to the American homeland, the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, and The Washington Post ran a long article about how foreign policy decision-making has slowed to a crawl under a swollen National Security Council staff in the White House.
Gee, is there a relationship between the two topics, d’ya think? Well, decision-making is a mess on subjects that don’t have the president’s personal attention.
Carping about White House dominance and interagency conflict is nothing new. President Kennedy often dealt directly with third-echelon and fourth-echelon officers at the State Department. The never-settled struggle for control between the State and Defense departments greatly harmed U.S. policies in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
The NSC staff was 25 under President Carter but 200 under President George W. Bush. President Obama added even more. White House micro-management, said former Defense Secretary Bob Gates after leaving office in 2011, “drove me crazy.”
Now White House meetings are said to march over old ground again and again. Example: Aside from nonlethal aid like food and tents, Obama has not decided yes or no after a year of discussion whether to send arms to Ukraine.
As for terrorism, military officials are said to emphasize al-Qaeda’s ability to mount massive long-distance attacks anywhere in the world; civilians see a greater threat in fanaticism the Islamic State inspires in young men. Conclusions — if there are any — help determine how funds and staff are allocated.
Are such decisions necessary? Both organizations are highly dangerous; trying to decide which is worse seems almost a time-wasting theological exercise.
Presidents can’t steer bureaucracies, but they need subordinates who can. Gates was good at it. We’re unlikely to see his like in the Obama crowd again,
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